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Abstract: "e aim of this essay is to examine an aspect of Par-
menides’ poem which is o#en overlooked: the psychological 
grounds Parmenides uses to construct his view. While it is widely 
recognized by scholars that following Parmenides’ view requires 
addressing mental activity, i.e. both the possibility of thinking the 
truth, as well as thinking along the wrong path that mortals fol-
low, a closer examination of the psychological assumptions in-
volved have, to my knowledge, not yet been attempted. I argue 
that by identifying and analyzing the psychological vocabulary 
in his poem, it is revealed that Parmenides was a keen observer 
of human mental behavior. "rough these psychological (per-
haps “cognitivist,” following some recent categories) observations 
of thought processes, Parmenides gains insight into the structure 
of thought itself. "e outcome of this inquiry reveals three nota-
ble conclusions: First, the poem contains a remarkably extensive 
use of strictly psychological vocabulary. Second, the presence of 
this psychological material and the lack of scholarly attention to 
it means there is a signi$cant aspect of Parmenides intellectual 
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legacy that remains unexplored — Parmenides as psychologist, 
keen observer of human mental behavior. Furthermore, the recog-
nition of this material helps shed important light on Parmenides’ 
philosophical message. Ultimately, I intend to provide an exhaus-
tive treatment of Parmenides’ psychological language, which 
requires close examination of DK B 1, 2, 6, and 7. Due to spatial 
constraints, I have divided the inquiry into two parts, and will only 
address DK 1-2 below.
Keywords: Parmenides, Eleaticism, Presocratics, ancient epis-
temology, ancient psychology.
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Fragment 6
I continue my discussion of Parmenides’ psycho-
logical observations with a close examination of Frag-
ment 6, as arranged by Diels-Kranz (DK)1:
χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, 
μηδὲν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν· τά σ’ ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα. πρώτης 
γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <       >,2 αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ ἀπὸ 
τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν πλάττονται, δίκρανοι· 
ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ 
δὲ φοροῦνται κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα 
φῦλα, οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται 
κοὐ ταὐτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.
As with the entirety of Parmenides’ enigmatic 
poem, there are numerous interpretative diculties 
contained within this fragment, and various scholarly 
perspectives drawn from them.  Most notable here 
is the question of whether DK 6.1-3 are referring 
to a possible “third way of inquiry,” which would 
seem inconsistent with the exhaustive dichotomy 
introduced in DK 2.  My own view is that the 
imputation of a “third way” is a mistake, one which 
has been de$nitively rejected by Cordero’s arguments 
against the unfounded conjecture of Diels – great 
German philologist that he was – at the end of DK 
6.3.3  Nevertheless, such philosophical details are not 
my concern in this inquiry, but rather the evidence for 
Parmenides psychological perspectives. In translating 
this fragment, I employ the same technical meaning 
(“cognitive operations) for the verb νοεῖν and its 
cognates, as was established in my treatment of DK 2 
in Part I of this inquiry.  
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Mortals Follow the Wrong Way: DK 6. 1-4: 
It is necessary to say and to think that by being, it is, since 
it is possible to be, and nothing[ness] does not exist. !is I 
order to proclaim since you <will begin> with this "rst way 
of investigation, but then with that made by mortals who 
know nothing…4
In the $rst verse of DK 6 there is a need to say and to 
engage in a cognitive operation which recognizes that 
“by being, it is.”  "is closely parallels the requirements 
set forth in DK 2, with additional content.  DK 2.3 de-
scribed the $rst way of inquiry as the path wherein 
cognitive operations lead to thinking that “it is” (what-
ever “it” refers to, and sense of “is” is employed), and 
that it is impossible to not be.  While the path in DK 
2.3 is explicitly correlated with “persuasion,” the neces-
sity for speaking and/or thinking that “by being, it is” is 
only added here in DK 6. Similarly, DK 2.5-7 outlines 
a second way of inquiry, wherein cognitive operations 
lead to thinking that “it is not” (again, whatever the 
referents and predications are), and that it is necessary 
not to be.  "is second way is described in DK 2 as a 
way which can neither be spoken of nor thought of. 
Note how this reverse-parallels the necessity to speak 
of and think that “it is,” on account of the presence of 
Being in DK 6.1.  "at is, whereas it was impossible to 
know (γνοίης) and say (φράσαις) “what is not” in DK 
2, here in DK 6 it is necessary to cognitively recognize 
(νοεῖν) and say (λέγειν) that “it is.”  "us, when Par-
menides employs the phrasing ‘since it is being (ἔστι 
γὰρ εἶναι) and nothing is not (μηδὲν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν) in 
DK 6.1-2, he is referring back to and further clarifying 
the fundamental theses he $rst advanced in DK 2.5
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In addition to noting the parallels between DK 6 
and DK 2, it is vital to keep in mind what Parmenides 
means by the word ‘nothing’ (μηδὲν).  As established 
in Part I, when Parmenides speaks about “what is 
not” (τό μὴ ἐὸν), he does not mean to employ stand-
ard verbal operations (predicative, veritative or oth-
er) on some general subject.  Rather, he is referring to 
the outcome of employing the process of negation to 
its logical extreme, a process which aims to reduce all 
things to “no thing,” expressed by ‘nothing’ in Eng-
lish, and ‘μηδὲν’ (literally, ‘no one’) in Greek. "us, 
by “what is not,” Parmenides refers to absolute noth-
ing – which, as DK 2 makes clear, is such that ‘it is 
impossible to be’.
If this inquiry sought to further explicate the 
philosophical meaning, these four verses would 
once again deserve far more extensive treatment. 
However, in keeping with the more restricted fo-
cus from Part I – strictly identifying and analyzing 
psychological content from the text – it is possible 
to move on at this point.  In the remaining verses 
of DK 6, Parmenides continues on to explaining his 
method. Verses 3 and 4 are object of rough contro-
versies, mainly for the lacuna in the original manu-
scripts. "e goddess ask the kouros to ‘do something’ 
with the $rst path (we do not know what, for the la-
cuna), and also to ‘do something’ else with the path 
followed by mortals. "is passage was and is object 
of a very great discussion in the $elds of paleogra-
phy, philology and philosophy; the topic at stake is 
is there is or there is not a third path pointed out 
by these words. However, we do not need indeed to 
face this discussion and we can jump it. To our ends, 
we will follow what Parmenides indicates as path (or 
Galgano, N. (2017). 
“Parmenides psycholo-
gist – Part Two: DK 6 
and 7.” p. 39-76 
44
nº 20, may-aug. 2017
paths) and its characters and qualities, without any 
worry of $nd out if it is the $rst or second or third or 
more, because we are interested just in the psycho-
logical vocabulary.
The Amazed Mortals: DK 6. 4b-9
[…] the way upon which mortals, knowing nothing, 
imagine/forge two-headed, since a helplessness/lacking 
in their breasts drives the wandering intellect; and they 
are carried along, deaf and blind alike, amazed, people 
with no discernment, by whom being and not being are 
believed to be the same, and not the same. And this path 
is backwards-turning for all.
With this explicit discussion of mortal’s mental be-
havior in verses 4-9, the most interesting aspects of 
Parmenides’ psychological observations begin to sur-
face. Parmenides says that mortals (βροτοί) who know 
nothing (εἰδότες οὐδὲν), imagine/forge (πλάττονται), 
in a “two-headed” manner (δίκρανοι).6 "is is a result 
of some sort of lacking (ἀμηχανίη) in their mind (lit-
erally, in their breast, στἠθεσιν), a lacking that leads 
to a “wandering thinking,” which is characterized as 
akin to being deaf, blind. In this state, it is as if they 
constitute their own race of people, one which is so 
utterly confused as to lack judgement entirely, such 
that they consider to be and not to be simultaneously 
both the same and not the same. Overall, this lacking 
results in their following a path which turns back on 
itself (παλίντροπός), trying to simultaneously follow 
opposing – and thus contradictory – judgments. "e 
meaning of this passage can be further explicated by 
paying close attention to the following terms:
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a) βροτοί. "ese verses clearly serve as a polemic 
against certain objectionable cognitive behaviors of (at 
least some) mortals. Yet, who exactly are the “mortals” 
being referred to? "ere are numerous opinions on this 
amongst scholars.7 From my understanding, although 
the poem’s intended audience is other men of learning, 
Parmenides here uses “mortals” to mean people who 
have a certain mind-set, without distinction between 
common people and ‘wise men’. "is is indicated by 
the qualifying description of mortals as ‘knowing noth-
ing’ (εἰδότες οὐδὲν), who in their ignorance invent 
(πλὰττονται) false and/or misleading (δίκρανοι) expla-
nations. "is description – along with the other quali-
$cations of “mortals” in this passage – are traditional 
descriptions found in the epic literature before Parme-
nides; the central contrast traditionally turns on the 
contraposition between divinity as powerful and om-
niscient, while mortals are limited and ignorant8. "is 
contraposition is also commonly found in Ionic and 
scienti$c texts, which provide even closer parallels to 
Parmenides’ usage. For example, in Xenophanes (one 
of Parmenides’ masters), we $nd: “One God is greatest 
among gods and men, not at all like mortals in body or 
in thought.” (DK 21 B 23, t. Lesher, 2001, p.96); “And of 
course the clear and certain truth no man has seen, nor 
will there be anyone who knows about the gods and what 
I say about all things. For even if, in the best case, one 
happened to speak just of what has been brought to pass, 
still he himself would not know. But opinion is allotted 
to all.” (DK 21 B 34, t. Lesher, 2001, p.155). Similarly, in 
Alcmaeon: “concerning things unseen, (as) concerning 
things mortal, the gods have certainty, whereas to us as 
men conjecture (only is possible)” (DK 24 B 1, t. Free-
man, 1948, p.40). Whereas the Archaic poets thought 
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the races of gods and men were irreconcilably di§erent 
in kind with respect to knowledge, by the 5th-4th cen-
turies BCE, a more nuanced comparison arises: while 
divine knowledge is perfect, human knowledge (not 
mere opinion), while imperfect, is possible. Whereas 
the Olympic religion maintained a strict separation 
between human and divine attributes, the later Mys-
tery religions o§ered a ritualistic means by which to 
bridge this separation. Similarly, the new Ionic (and 
later Italic) naturalism constructed a new intellectual 
paradigm, whereby new methods for understanding 
the world were developed, gradually elevating human 
capacities for problem-solving, and thereby encroach-
ing upon traditionally divine purviews. "is improve-
ment in the lot of mortals is not based upon men be-
coming gods, but because men can partially overcome 
the amēkhaniē of human condition through their new-
found knowledge. However, this development is once 
again gradual. Xenophanes and Alcmaeon had not yet 
found a reliable method, so they treat human knowl-
edge as something conjectural, a possibility that might 
be realized through further study that follows a proper 
method. Parmenides, on the other hand, believes him-
self to be in possession of just such a method, and this 
tool $nally permits him to speak in terms of following 
a path that leads to “true conviction” (πίστις ἀληθής) in 
Parmenides. In order to indicate this gradual develop-
ment towards genuine knowledge, Parmenides begins 
by contrasting it with the more limited human condi-
tion found in the epic tradition, using the epic term 
brotoi (“mortals”) as a short-hand placeholder indicat-
ing that traditionally limited condition9.
b) πλάττονται. Most scholars who read πλάττονται 
understand it to mean ‘err’; however, this results in the 
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psychological content of the Parmenidean expression 
being completely lost. By adopting a more literal trans-
lation – i.e. ‘invent’ or ‘forge’ – it is possible to preserve 
this content, and provide a more coherent point. On 
this reading, the problematic mental activity is that 
βροτοὶ--again, in the traditional sense, whose ordinary 
human condition is to know nothing (εἰδότες οὐδὲν) – 
invent their own erroneous paths (πλάττονται), rather 
than following the correct path of inquiry10. It is $tting 
and natural that such mortals would naively forge/in-
vent subjective explanations, as they lack any reliable 
methodology by which to overcome their ordinary 
condition and explain the world objectively. Without 
a reliable objective method, they resort to creation of 
(more or less internally consistent) explanations that 
make intuitive sense, driving the creation of tradi-
tional myths. Cordero (1984, p.148) makes this point 
clear, pointing to the use of πλάσσω in Plato’s Timaeus, 
where Critias says: “not invented myth but true ac-
count” (μὴ πλασθέντα μῦθον ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθινὸν λόγον, Ti. 
26.e.4). As noted in Part 1, the awareness that mythical 
explanations are mere fantasy is already present in the 
masters of Parmenides, and the overarching subject of 
Parmenides’ poem is not the armation of ‘being’ (as 
a certain type of idealistic historiography prefers), but 
the distinction between true and untrue forms of per-
suasion – respectively parallel to true accounts v. mere 
fantasy – as made clear in the programmatic outline 
in DK 1. 29-30. As the gods (with only some notable 
exceptions) speak the truth, the lack of true persuasion 
would customarily $nd its origin in mortals – i.e. the 
invention of ‘false’ myths is a cra# of mortals. Hence, 
to impute the invention of false myths to mortals here 
is perfectly consistent with his proposal. Moreover, the 
general criticism of mythical modes of thought, while 
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admittedly more readily explicit in Xenophanes, is not 
overly hidden in the suggestive verses of the Parme-
nides’ poem, as will become clear below, in the discus-
sion of fr. 7. To recount, here it should be emphasized 
that Parmenides observes a common mental behavior: 
mortals, knowing nothing, fantasize and invent expla-
nations, attempting to account for some phenomena 
of the world. In doing so, Parmenides is not so di§er-
ent from modern psychologists, who in their attempts 
to account for that which they do not have any genuine 
capacities for understanding, o§er more or less plau-
sible invented explanations. Nevertheless, while Par-
menides casts this common psychological behavior 
in terms of traditional conceptions regarding mortal 
limitations, and in doing so treats it as a failing, it is 
vital to note that he does not hold this condition to be 
a fatally permanent lacking that cannot be overcome, 
nor a moralistic rebuke. Furthermore, it is not a failing 
that applies to certain persons, under certain condi-
tions. Rather, Parmenides is like the modern psychol-
ogist scientist – one who in this case identi$es a uni-
versal problem for human beings in a neutral manner 
(withholding judgment), who then seeks to prescribe 
solutions for the psychological lacking (ἀμηκανἰη) 
inherently intrinsic to βροτοὶ11. 
c) ἀμηχανίη. "is term is a common epithet de-
scribing the inferior condition of mortals in the epic 
and lyric traditions. While many scholars adopt and 
translate its more literal meaning ‘lack of resources’12, 
others prefer to translate ‘perplexity’13, emphasiz-
ing the cognitive context. In any case, the “lacking” 
here must clearly refer to some human limitation, 
one that tends to result in mortals developing a 
wandering behavior of noos (ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον). 
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"e preponderance of scholars focus on contrasting 
this overall negative characterization of mental behav-
ior for ordinary βροτοὶ with Parmenides’ description 
of the εἰδότα φῶτα (the wise man) from DK B 1. 3. 
However, I think there is a deeper psychological 
aspect to Parmenides’ use of ἀμηχανίη here, which 
has gone so far unnoticed. Recall that Parmenides 
says that the lack of resources (ἀμηχανίη) in their 
breast (ἐν αὐτῶν στήθεσιν) – which again means ‘in 
their mind’ here (as ētor, in 1. 29) – causes a wander-
ing thinking. "is means that Parmenides is not re-
ferring to a generic lack of resources, nor to that ge-
neric limitation of βροτοὶ in relation to gods, but to 
a lack of resources in the mind (ἀμηχανίη ἐν αὐτῶν 
στήθεσιν). "e precise wording of the goddess make 
this limited scope clear: “because (γὰρ) inability of 
their minds drives (ἰθύνει) a wandering thinking”14. 
In other words, it is not about the incapacity of mor-
tals as a whole, but just a part, i.e. human mind. "e 
conception of ἀμηχανίη (“lack of resources”), as an 
alpha-privative (ἀ+μηχανίη), implicitly invokes its 
oppositional root μηχανή (“possession of resources’). 
Hence, just as a lacking (ἀμηχανίη) is the cause of a 
wandering mental behavior for mortals – wherein 
they $rst arm something and a#er, arming the 
opposite, contradict themselves – it would seem that 
were those same mortals to possess a proper mental 
“resource” or “tool” (μηχανή), they could thereby avoid 
this error. "us, Parmenides may instead by drawing a 
more general and universal contrast between the ex-
plicitly noted psychological lacking (ἀμηχανίη), and 
its most direct opposite – a “possession of resources,” 
or a “tool” (μηχανή) for the mind, by which this unfor-
tunate condition might be overcome. And it is precisely 
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this “tool” (μηχανή) which Parmenides means to pro-
vide, allowing mortals to $nally overcome their tradi-
tionally limited condition with respect to inquiry, and 
discovering accounts that are truly persuasive. "us, 
Parmenides has once again taken a common lyric and 
epic epithet (ἀμηχανίη), describing the traditionally 
inferior condition of mortals, and used it in a more 
specialized way to indicate a ®awed nature that can be 
overcome. Here, he is indicating a particular psycho-
logical behavior which leads mortal thinking astray, 
for which his own endorsed way of thinking can pro-
vide a corrective solution. "is becomes more evident 
as the $nal verses are considered more closely.
d) οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί. "is 
phrase serves to further describe the e§ects of a 
mortal mind that su§ers from amēkhaniē, and special 
attention must be paid to the term omōs, ‘alike’15. "e 
grammatical subject oi refers back to brotoi, and the 
verb phorountai (here a passive of phoreō) points back 
to the amēkhaniē of the mind that drives the brotoi, and 
hence as the cause by which they are driven. Mortals 
(brotoi) are here described as “driven alike deaf and 
blind people (κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί). As Parmenides 
is clearly attempting to o§er novel descriptions 
of mental activities – sensations, dynamics, and 
concrete mental deeds – he should be not be taken 
to be referring to sense perception in general, nor 
that such mortals are literally deaf and blind. Rather, 
he once again seems to be struggling to adequately 
express himself with the extant vocabulary available 
to him. "at there is a tendency to link sensitiveness 
in and clarity of sense perception with correct 
reasoning is even preserved in modern language, as 
is evident with words like ‘evidence’, ‘clearness’, etc. 
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Given these considerations, it seems best then to 
take him to be pointing to some likeness between 
blindness/deafness and the psychological ἀμηχανίη 
under discussion – that there is some way in which 
the lacking in their mind makes mortals mentally 
de$cient in a way similar to how people with a lack 
of ability in their sense-organs are de$cient in their 
sensory perceptions16.
Now, how exactly might a mind without resourc-
es drive people in a way resembling deafness and 
blindness? Such a mind relies upon wandering cog-
nitive operations (plankton noon), lacking the prop-
er tools (amēkhaniē) by which they might correctly 
understand the world. So, lacking the mental means 
by which correct understanding is achieved, they 
fail to understand properly. Similarly, those who 
are deaf and blind might be understood as sharing: 
a) a lacking in the sensory tools (i.e. sense organs) 
by which proper sense perception is achieved, and 
thus their minds fail to obtain the data needed for 
certain sense-perceptions, or b) a particular lack-
ing in the mind itself, which prevents them from 
understanding the data which their organs collect, 
and thus fail to generate certain sense-perceptions 
in their mind. In either case, their sense-perception 
of reality would fail due to a lacking in capacity, just 
as those who lack the sucient tools for inquiry fail 
to grasp reality objectively and truly. Whatever the 
proper analogy, Parmenides has rightly ascertained 
that there is a distinct role for the mind in properly 
understanding reality, and the outcome of the men-
tal functions depends upon correct and incorrect 
(trustworthy and untrustworthy) methods/tools for 
obtaining such understanding. 
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e) τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα. Two more clear-
ly psychological notions are found in this clause. 
Τεθηπότες, “amazed,” must carry some psychologi-
cal meaning with respect to “mental sharpness.” In 
context, this “amazement” is another result of mor-
tals’ ἀμηχανίη, serving a similar novel descriptive 
function as “deafness and blindness,” with respect to 
their mental incapacity, Ruggiu (1975, p.143) o§ers 
an instructive to comparison of the Parmenidean us-
age here with a passage from Homer (Od. 23. 105), 
noting that a ‘great surprise’ results in Penelope’s in-
capacity to speak or see: “the heart in my breast is lost 
in wonder, and I have no power to speak at all, nor to 
ask a question, nor to look him in the face.” (Murray, 
1919)17. "us, it would seem that there was already a 
recognition that being “amazed” (τέθηπα) is closely 
associated with inabilities (i.e. ἀμηχανίη) in: speech, 
inquiry, and sight. However, this attribute (τέθηπα) 
goes further here, making such brotoi a speci$c hu-
man kind (ἄκριτα φῦλα) – a people without the ca-
pacity for exercising judgement (κρίσις). "e judg-
ment that brotoi lack is the ability to properly draw 
a distinction between being and non-being, which 
they take to be both the same and not the same (οἷς 
τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται  κοὐ 
ταὐτόν). "is failure to distinguish between being 
and not being is once again a failure in cognitive op-
erations, a mental activity that confounds brotoi on 
account of their lack of a resources (ἀμηχανίη) in the 
mind. Were mortals to possess the appropriate men-
tal tool (μηχανίη) which makes such distinctions 
possible, they could overcome this limitation. With-
out this resource, cognitive operations have no clear 
direction, which is why Parmenides goes on describe 
the path of mortals as…
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f) πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος. "is 
much-discussed statement on the “reversibility” 
(παλίντροπός) of the path brotoi follow ends this frag-
ment18. However, in light of the diculty brotoi face in 
distinguishing between being and not being, and their 
simultaneous, contradictory judgments concern-
ing each, it seems more apt to translate παλίντροπός 
more literally, describing their path as “contrary”19. 
So this fragment ends, trading heavily on psychologi-
cal observations, with a closing description of mental 
behavior as an erroneous “path of inquiry” – upon 
which armation and negation are thought to be 
both the same and not the same, on account of a lack 
of discernment and mental capacity (or tools) in the 
minds of mortals. 
Conclusion of fragment 6
Verses 4-9 of Fragment 6 contain a focused de-
scription of mortals’ mental behavior, which su§ers 
from an initial problem. "is problem is the lacking 
of a certain mental resource/tool, the result of which 
is that mortals su§er in their mental capacity in some 
way similar to how the deaf and blind su§er in their 
perceptual abilities. Being so intellectually “amazed” 
(τεθηπότες), they are a race unto themselves, inca-
pable of discernment (ἄκριτα φῦλα) – particularly 
in the case of distinguishing being versus not being. 
In short, the lack of a proper method of inquiry leads 
them invent erroneous paths (πλάττονται) for in-
quiry, so that when they attempt to explain the world, 
their confusion leads them to simultaneously contra-
dict themselves, along with one another. Most schol-
ars emphasize the negative warning in this passage 
– that there is a path that mortals erroneously follow 
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in their confusion, which a “knowing man” should 
not, as this path is not in accord with the path of be-
ing, wherein the still heart of truth lies (treatment of 
which seems to immediately follow, in Fragment 8, on 
Diels-Kranz’s arrangement). However, while I do think 
that Parmenides is describing mortals’ limits, his criti-
cism is more narrowly focused than is o#en realized. 
Parmenides is not here comparing limited mortal ca-
pacities for understanding with the powers of divinity; 
rather, he is identifying a failure in psychological activ-
ity (the ἀμηχανίη) with respect to argument formation 
and proper inquiry. Recognizing this psychological 
lacking (it would be inappropriate to say dysfunction), 
Parmenides proceeds to o§er a psychological diagnosis 
for mortal misunderstandings – that mortals lack the 
proper tool(s) for following the path of true persuasion. 
In contrast, the goddess clearly possesses this tool, as 
she does not su§er from such a psychological lacking. 
"us Parmenides, via the poem’s spokes-goddess, sets 
out a didactic program for the youth, by which the god-
dess will instruct her disciple by providing a (μηχανή) 
– in this case, an arti$cial tool (as revealed below) – 
by which the lacking in mortal psychology can be 
overcome. So, while mortals do su§er from a lacking 
(amēkhaniē,) Parmenides’ lesson is that there exists a 
certain tool by which this ®aw in mental operations can 
be overcome, removing them from their condition as 
ἄκριτα φῦλα, and providing them at last the means by 
which they can properly distinguish true persuasion 
from its absence, and being from not being.
Fragment 7
Fragment 7 is an amalgamation, generated from 
apparently overlapping verses from several sources: 
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Plato, Sextus Empiricus, Simplicius and Diogenes 
Laertius. However, I once again leave the more ex-
egetical considerations aside, maintaining a focus on 
the psychological vocabulary – the consideration of 
which arrangement of the quotations and fragments 
have relatively little impact. Here is the text, accord-
ing to Diels20: 
οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα· ἀλλὰ σὺ 
τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα μηδέ σ’ ἔθος 
πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω, νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον 
ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι 
πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.
"e immense philosophical value in the $rst two 
lines is undeniable. Here, we $nd an initial formula-
tion of the Principle of Non-Contradiction, a concep-
tion which Aristotle will famously clarify further in 
his own version. Also, worthy of note is the repeti-
tion of the basic Parmenidean concern – i.e. to dis-
cover and distinguish the di§erent paths of inquiry 
for cognitive operations, and upon analysis make use 
of the proper path. Here he seems to conclude this 
investigation into the paths that are possible, picking 
out a certain ὁδός διζήσιος (path of inquiry, hence 
cognitive mental processes) which from this point 
forwards the kouros should make sure to avoid – i.e. 
keeping his inquiring thought (i.e. cognitive opera-
tions) away (εἶργε νόημα) from it. In short, the youth 
is commanded not to follow this process of thinking 
because it is contradictory. However, there is little of 
psychological relevance in these $rst two verses. For 
the purposes of this inquiry, it is important to look 
more closely at what follows
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On the other hand, verses 7.3-6 require special at-
tention, as there are multiple meanings embedded 
within them. "ese verses clearly provide an exhor-
tation to avoid the path that confuses being and not 
being. "ere are two general groups which previous 
scholarly positions on this fragment can be sorted into. 
"e $rst group overlooks the fact that Parmenides’ 
discussion of “paths of inquiry” (v. 2, ὁδός διζήσιος) 
picks out a type of mental behavior, and here takes 
Parmenides to be speaking against the trustworthi-
ness of the senses21. In contrast, the other group does 
recognize that “paths of inquiry” is about mental be-
havior – that is, about methods of inquiry22. My own 
reading, of course, tends to fall into the latter position, 
with respect to this controversy. However, my view is 
also largely di§erent from that of other scholars in 
many ways, particularly with respect to the meaning 
of the last verse (fr. 7. 6), as will be made clear below. 
Overall, I take the general meaning of this frag-
ment as an exhortation to avoid the path that leads 
to thinking that being and non-being are the same 
and not the same. More speci$cally in this context, 
the fragment warns against unre®ectively following 
cultural norms regarding mental behavior and sense-
perception. For the goddess conjoins her injunction 
against following the path which confuses being and 
not being, by demanding the youth also avoid letting 
the habit that was experienced many times force you 
on that path. "is cultural inheritance of habits – in 
which eyes, ears and tongue are mixed up – results in 
bad judgement and misunderstanding, unlike proper 
and persuasive discourse. 
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"e overarching argument seems to go as follows. 
Here, the goddess again references paths of cognitive 
operations. "ese are paths along which thoughts can 
be properly sequenced into a coherent argument. "e 
identity of these paths relies upon psychological dis-
tinctions made earlier in the poem. First, that there 
are good and bad arguments (those of true persua-
sion, and those without true persuasion, fr. 1.29-30). 
Second, that good arguments (wherein persuasion ac-
companies the truth, fr. 2. 4) are ultimately the result 
of a special resource of mind – the lack of which ca-
pacity in mortals results only in the production of bad 
arguments, for they erroneously believe being and 
non-being are both the same and not the same. Here, 
in 7.1-2, the goddess adds to this, claiming that being 
and non-being are in fact distinct, since non-beings 
never become being. As following that path results in 
contradiction, the youth must avoid it entirely, and 
not allow the repeated habit to force him upon it.
Cultural habits, the verse 7.3
"e goddess orders the kouros to stay away from 
that path and, at the same time, warns against be-
ing forced upon it by “much-experienced habit” (re-
lating to eyes, ears, tongue and discourses). What is 
this “habit”? It is a habitual behavior of mind or, in 
Parmenides’ words, a habitual way of thinking. "e 
word πολύπειρον literally means ‘experienced many 
times’23. Parmenides is thus picking out the experi-
ence of thinking along certain a certain way (“path”), 
which having been repeated many times, has become 
habitual – i.e. an “automatism” of the mind. Parme-
nides here seems to be observing that there are ten-
dencies in mental behavior, o# referred to as forma 
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mentis. Such mental behavior is learned, through 
repetition, until it becomes automatic (habitual). "e 
mental habituation Parmenides is criticizing here is 
one that depends upon acculturation – a forma men-
tis of a group (φῦλα, fr. 6.7). "e fact that very dif-
ferent ways of thinking can be the result of culture 
was already recognized in Parmenides’ time. Xen-
ophanes makes this clear in his famous commentary 
about the variety of views held by the gods in dif-
ferent cultures (fr. DK B 14 and 16). "us, it is no 
surprise to $nd his disciple, Parmenides, thinking 
along similar lines. Parmenides goes further than his 
master, however. Whereas Xenophanes points to and 
describes what the di§erences are across cultures, 
Parmenides o§ers explanations for how these dif-
ferences are generated and reproduce one another. 
Parmenides recognizes that certain ways of thinking 
inform cultural norms, and cultural norms drive us 
towards certain ways of thinking. In other words, 
not only does Parmenides posit that di§erent ways 
of thinking lead to cultural di§erences, but that cul-
tural di§erences themselves lie in the background 
to and inform certain ways of thinking, resulting in 
certain general patterns for learning and thinking 
(i.e. not just with respect to religious views). Just as 
immersion in a culture generates certain manners 
of thinking, so can certain ways of thinking repro-
duce cultural norms, further reinforcing that culture 
and it norms, which in turn again reproduces the 
culturally-based ways of thinking, and so on, mutu-
ally reinforcing one another. "erefore, in the pro-
cess of explaining how the learning process works, 
and criticizing certain culturally-grounded mental 
habits, Parmenides is also o§ering severe criticism 
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against traditional ways of thinking – particularly 
those which reproduce themselves through unre-
®ective repetition, forcing thought (cognitive opera-
tions) to remain on its original route (i.e. that of the 
traditional culture). Furthermore, alongside this cul-
tural criticism of tradition in general, Parmenides is 
also criticizing a speci$c, sensory-based method of 
inquiry, as well as educational norms.
Many scholars have thought that these criticisms 
are directed towards some speci$c philosophical 
school(s) or thinker(s). However, the possible philo-
sophical targets were all quite recent, relatively close 
to Parmenides’ own time. Furthermore, none of these 
ways of thinking are representative of traditional cul-
ture. "ese factors make it quite dicult to square Par-
menides’ description of his target as thought which is 
“much-experienced habit” (ἔθος πολύπειρον), arising 
from a cultural context. As there is no philosophical 
target explicitly picked out in the text, despite the fact 
that this criticism is advanced by a divine mouth-piece, 
it would seem Parmenides’ target must be mythic (i.e. 
religious) thought. Mythic thought is the problem-
atic cultural tradition which erroneously constrains 
thinking (cognitive operations) onto wandering paths 
(πλακτὸν νόον, fr. 6.6) which are unpersuasive24. 
Sight, hearing and tongue: Verses 4 and 5
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν καὶ 
γλῶσσαν: Once again, Parmenides here uses periph-
rases to explain his point of view. "e goddess has al-
ready enjoined the youth to not habitually follow the 
“much-experienced path,” which involves habitually 
“exercising (νωμᾶν) an eye without sight (ἄσκοπον 
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ὄμμα) and a noisy ear (ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν) and a 
tongue (γλῶσσαν)25. If this is limited to an epistemo-
logical reading – as most scholars do – there seems to 
only be a straightforward metaphor for confused and 
imprecise cognition, reliant upon sense-perception 
alone. However, as the Parmenidean sensitiveness to 
psychological observation has been established above, 
the introduction of an epistemological metaphor is 
less likely in this context. As outlined in the treatment 
of Fragment 6, imagery of confused senses are com-
monly used in an attempt to imperfectly capture how 
a lacking in mental capacity and/or resources leads 
to similar mental confusions. Parmenides seems to 
similarly rely upon this analogous imagery here. An 
eye that does not see is an eye that provides data to 
the mind, but the mind lacks the appropriate men-
tal capacities (cognitive operations) to incorporate the 
images from the physical eyes into a coherent sense 
perception. Similar treatments could of course be 
provided regarding deafness. Also, it is worth consid-
ering how discourse, even that which is free of contra-
dictions and compelling, are incapable of persuading 
one who has a ‘ringing’ (confused) ear. In any case, 
the meaning here should not be understood as a met-
aphorical rejection of the inadequacy of sense-per-
ception in relation to reason. Rather, it is an attempt 
at description of a mental behavior and, in this special 
case a description of cognitive operations, which uses 
commonly understood language of sensory de$cien-
cies to indicate failures of mental operations. 
Judging by the logos, verses 5 and 6.
κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον ἐξ ἐμέθενῥηθέντα.
Most scholars translate this clause in approximately 
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the following way: “judge by reason the too much 
contested argument which has been given by me”26. 
From Plotinus to the mid-20th century, this has been 
considered one of the high points of the poem. However, 
there are many historical problems faced by putting so 
much emphasis on the word, λόγος in this case, and 
translating it as “reason.” While this same word will 
certainly come to have an incomparably important role 
in history of philosophy with this meaning (“reason” 
and “rationality”), it does not seem to have held this 
platonistic sense in Parmenides’ time, as the past $#y-
plus years of scholarship have shown. However, restoring 
the poem to avoid this interpretative element has 
progressed slowly. To better capture the sense of these 
verses without imputing the anarchistic “reason,” I here 
employ the philological interpretation and translation 
of Christopher Kurfess (2012, p.76-77), who o§ers a 
reading which I believe to be far more in keeping with 
Presocratic and Parmenidean perspectives:
But do you bar thought from this way of seeking, And let 
not habit of much experience force you, along this way, To 
ply an aimless eye and echoing hearing And tongue, and to 
judge, by means of speech, the elenchos Spoken by me (to 
be) much-contending.
"is translation “and let not habit of much experi-
ence force you […] to judge, by means of speech, the 
elenchus27 spoken by me (to be) much-contending” 
seems to me much more natural, and more adherent 
to not only to the spirit and mentality of those early 
thinkers, but also to the spirit of the text itself. "ough 
Kurfess considers the Parmenidean warning in these 
lines ‘curious’, I think that the goddess here presents 
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a powerful argument against seductive rhetoric in 
discourse. "is criticism applies not only to politi-
cal rhetoric (Parmenides himself was a successful 
politician of an eunomic polis28), but also to mythi-
cal rhetoric and discourse that is concerned with 
describing the structure and functions of the world. 
Seductive rhetoric is characterized by the traditions 
of using rhythmic speech and formulaic models, in-
viting the listener to ‘see’ the world from a particular 
perspective (weltanschauung). "e old, traditional 
weltanschauungen was grounded in mythical think-
ing, a world-view the new cultural perspectives de-
veloped by the Presocratics – particularly the more 
theoretical ones – o#en challenge, directly or indi-
rectly. As noted above, cultural perspectives tend to 
reinforce and reproduce themselves, and in doing so, 
reject new alternatives. "is is why here the goddess 
implores the youth to avoid such prejudiced and un-
re®ective rejection of her account, and to judge the 
account in her speech upon its merits. In short, to 
carefully consider ‘new discourses’ (i.e. non-tradi-
tional theories developed through investigation and 
re®ection by Parmenides and other wise men), which 
though they challenge traditional accounts, may nev-
ertheless prove themselves reliable and convincing, 
the result of a trustworthy method. "is interpreta-
tion Fragment 7’s conclusion does not change the 
general meaning of Parmenides’ criticism against tra-
ditional knowledge. In fact, it would seem to support 
that argument, as I have outlined it. And Parmenides’ 
criticism of traditional perspectives can be realized 
without the need to appeal to anachronistic appeals 
to “reason” as the di§erentiating and superior epis-
temic standard between mythic discourse and Par-
menides’ argumentation. 
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Conclusion
"is investigation set out to focus on the psy-
chological aspects of Parmenides` poem, trying to 
make evident the author`s insightful engagement in 
the observation of human mental behavior. In the 
process, a special meaning of verb νοεῖν and its cog-
nates was extracted from quali$cation Parmenides 
imputed upon its usage – ‘to engage in cognitive 
operations’. "is is an operation between ‘thinking’ 
and ‘knowing’ – the conceptions normally imputed 
upon νοεῖν by scholars. Upon examination, `think-
ing` turned out to be too inclusive a notion, appli-
cable to all the aspects of knowing (a subject who 
knows, a cognitive mean, an object of knowing). On 
the other hand, ‘knowing’ was simultaneously too 
restrictive, referring to that kind of thinking directed 
to the speci$c knowing of an object. Instead, for Par-
menides, the path of thinking is similar to capacities 
for hearing and seeing, requiring the employment 
of external tools in order to be free from prejudice, 
such that arguments can be analyzed with proper 
care, i.e. analyzing arguments with care). "e chosen 
de$nition (cognitive operations), while quite techni-
cal, proved quite functional in $ltering out the ambi-
guities included in translations such as ‘to think’ and 
‘to know’. It also helped in resisting the temptation 
to go o§-topic, enlarging the thesis of this discus-
sion into epistemological and philosophical arenas, 
rather than strictly psychological. 
Applying this understanding of νοεῖν alongside an 
analysis of four selected fragments from Parmenides’ 
poem, the following conclusions were drawn:
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a) Fragment 1: Using corporeal language, Parme-
nides distinguishes between states of certainty and 
doubt, and introduces the concept of persuasion as the 
intermediary activity between these conditions. Mind 
is that which can be in either state – it can be per-
suaded by true persuasion into certainty just as much 
as by the lack of true persuasion into doubt. 
b) Fragment 2: Parmenides presents his re®ec-
tions about how the mind works, positing two paths 
for thinking. As this inquiry is not focused upon fol-
lowing the philosophical upshots of this distinction, 
the main point of analyzing this fragment is to ex-
tract Parmenides’ special usage of νοεῖν as picking 
out cognitive operations. "is specialized technical 
meaning is used throughout the poem, and proves 
essential for understanding Parmenides’ role as a 
psychological observer. Other psychological termi-
nology in this passage is also analyzed, particularly 
the meaning of ‘paths’ as mental behavior, rather 
than physical ‘pathways’ to follow. 
c) Fragment 6: Here it is argued that Parmenides 
is further examining the two paths of investigation 
he has identi$ed in DK 2, distinguishing the ways in 
which they are followed by ordinary mortals given 
their natural psychology, in contrast to the manner 
of a wise man who has been suciently instructed 
by the goddess. "ere is a particular mental resource 
that mortals do not inherently possess, but which can 
be provided by the goddess. Without this resource, 
mortals believe that being and non-being are both the 
same and not the same, whereas the wise man with 
this resource can correctly discern that these are radi-
cally distinct. "us, the wise man can follow the path 
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of persuasion that accompanies the truth, whereas 
mortals whose mind behaves alike the deaf and the 
blind, forge inappropriate paths.
d) Fragment 7: Parmenides deepens the analysis 
identified in DK 6. Here, he begins by explicating 
his most famous precept – the absolute dissociation 
between being and non-being. This rather simple 
observation is not obvious – in fact, it tends to be 
missed entirely in common understanding. Parme-
nides then notes from his social observations that 
mortals tend to develop certain ways of thinking 
as a result of cultural habituation. This cultural 
habituation depends upon discourse which is se-
ductive to the sense organs and senses (ears/hear-
ing, eyes/sight, tongue). As these ways of thinking 
tend to unreflectively accept traditional views, and 
thus reject those which are contrary to traditional 
views out of prejudice, the wise man should not al-
low himself to be forced in this mental mode, but to 
judge the speech/argument on its merits. In sum-
mary, this fragment turns out to be a warning to 
those who would seek to think properly to avoid 
prejudices (derived largely from myth, and thus 
traditional religious thinking), in favor of more ob-
jective analysis.
Overall, this evidence demonstrates that Parme-
nides was an extraordinary observer human mental 
behavior, a fact which has extensive and profound 
implications for his philosophical thought. So much 
so that it seems impossible to adequately treat the im-
plications in full here, and must await further discus-
sion elsewhere. However, as I also do not think this 
work can be ever by adequately completed by myself 
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alone, I encourage others to take up and discuss Par-
menides’ psychological observations along with me. 
Notas
1  I would like to thank Jeremy Delong, a brave Parmenidean 
scholar who not only assisted in the translation of both parts 
of this article, but o§ered insightful commentary throughout, 
greatly improving my approach to this complex text.  Of course, 
all problems in the present interpretation of Parmenides are my 
responsibility alone.  To him, I extend only gratitude.  
2  Simplicius is our only source for these lines, and there is a 
lacuna here in all the manuscripts. 
3  Cordero, 2005, p. 145-164; 2007.
4  I use Cordero’s translation here, whose seminal monogra-
ph borrows its title (“By Being, It Is”) from this verse and posits 
αρκει to be the correct emendation for the lacuna at the end of 
6.3.”
5  Note the di§erences between this simple and literal trans-
lation and the translation of Cordero.
6  Capizzi (1975, p.37) translates “doppiezza”, duplicity, here 
in the meaning of falsity, dissimulation.
7  An extensive review of scholarly views can be found in 
Zeller (1967, p.173-183, n.3 de Giovanni Reale). "e discussion 
has largely centered upon whether βροτοὶ was intended to pick 
out and criticize Heracliteans or not. "e view that Heracliteans 
were the polemical target has been de$nitively laid to rest by 
Mansfeld (1960), who clearly showed that since the vocabulary 
used was already extant in lyric poetry, similar phrasing cannot 
be used as evidence for a Heraclitean target in Parmenides.
8  For example, in Il. 5. 440: “ἐπεὶ οὔ ποτε φῦλον ὁμοῖον 
ἀθανάτων τε θεῶν χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων τ’ ἀνθρώπων.” […] never 
the same is the breed of gods; who are immortal, and men who 
walk groundling” (tr. Lattimore, 1951). A good synthesis of these 
notions are in the words of Mansfeld, quoted by Reale (1967, 
p.182): “… [these verses] are referred to a general Greek con-
ception of the nature of human knowledge, which: 1) is nothing 
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in comparison to divine knowledge; 2) in the way it is, does 
not suce to the own life.”  Note that Parmenides uses both 
denominations: ἄνθρωπος in DK B 1. 27, 16. 2, 16. 3, 19. 3 and 
βροτοὶ in 1. 30, 6. 4, 8. 39, 8. 51, 8. 61. 
9  "ere is a case of synonymy between 8. 38-39, “ὄνομ(α) 
... βροτοὶ κατέθεντο”, and 19.3, ὄνομ’ ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντο, as 
Cordero notices (1984, p.149, n.157). However, the fact that 
Parmenides uses them synonymously once does not mean that 
they are synonymous in all cases. Parmenides uses βροτοὶ four 
times (1. 30, 6. 4, 8. 39, 8. 61) and the adjective βροτείας once. 
"ese usages are always associated with the mind being astray 
in relation to the truth: 1.30: “βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις 
ἀληθής”; 6. 4: “βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν”; 8. 39: “πάντ’ ὄνομ(α) 
ἔσται, ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,”; 8. 51: 
“δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων 
ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.”; 8. 61: “ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη 
παρελάσσηι.” On the other hand, ἄνθρωποι is used in several 
contexts: in 1. 27: “τήνδ’ ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου 
ἐστίν)”, where “path of men”—despite many imaginative scho-
larly explanations—likely means simply ‘the ‘path’ (i.e. road) 
of humans, rather than that of beasts or things (wind, water 
etc.); in 16. 2 and16. 3: “τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρίσταται” and 
“τὸ γὰρ αὐτό ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν”, 
ἄνθρωποι necessarily refers to humans in general (wise or not), 
since the context is anatomical-physiological descriptions; then, 
only in 19. 3, is it used as synonym of βροτοὶ in the ‘human con-
dition” sense.   Based upon the usage in the extant fragments, 
the word ἄνθρωποι includes the meaning of βροτοὶ, but not the 
other way around.   
10  I read the more widely attested πλάττονται in 6.5 (from 
πλάσσω. LSJ: mould, form an image of a thing in the mind, 
forge). "is contrasts with the acceptance by most scholars of 
πλάζονται (from πλάζω. LSJ: ba/e, go astray, wander.  LSJ also 
includes the Parmenidean πλάττονται in the entry πλάζω), 
based upon Diels’ adoption of the Aldine edition from 1526. 
"is reading allows for a more coherent interpretation, where-
by mortals “invent” a path through fantasizing (i.e. invent ex-
planations), whereas πλάζω would simply mean a “wandering 
of humans.” A complete philological discussion can be found 
in Cordero (1984, p.147-8 and 2005, p.146-7). "ose who 
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accept πλάζω include: Diels, Barnes, Burnet, Coxon, Ruggiu, 
Tarán, Untersteiner, Verdenius, Za$ropulo. "e few who accept 
πλάττονται from πλάσσω are: Cordero, Cerri, O’Brien, Santoro 
e Ferrari.
11  As we will soon see below, this particularly problematic 
mental behavior arises in response to an initial problem—a cer-
tain lack of resources in the mind. 
12  For example: Beaufret (1955, p.81), “l’absence de moyens”; 
Riezler-Gadamer (1970, p.29) “Hil®osigkeit”; Somville (1976, 
p.42) “l’impuissance”.
13  For example: Coxon (2009, p.58) “perplexity”; Casertano 
(1978, p.17) “incertezza”; Untersteiner (1979, p.135) “perplessità”.
14  Once again, mind is described in its operations and, by 
the contextual quali$cation (πλακτὸν, a verb of movement), it 
is easy to understand that Parmenides is focused on the opera-
tions themselves; however, the notion will remain ambiguous if 
we use the most common terms to translate (i.e. ‘thought,’ ‘intel-
lect,’ etc.). For this reason, the translation here given to νοῆσαι 
of 2. 2 (and its cognates), cognitive operations, is essential to 
making clear the Parmenidean expression.
15  Most scholars, likely assuming a rhetorical-metaphori-
cal meaning, translate following Diels, (1989, p.233) “zugleich”, 
“for example: at once” (Palmer, 2009, p.114); “ad un tempo” 
(Reale, 1991, p.95); “tão surdos como cegos” (Santoro, 2011, 
p.91); “at the same time” (Tarán, 1965, p.54). Some alternative 
approaches include: “ciegos y sordos” (Cordero, 2005, p.219, 
who simply does not translate ὁμῶς); “deaf and blind alike in 
bewilderment” (Coxon, p.58, who, linking ὁμῶς to τεθηπότες, 
understands the meaning to be ‘alike they were in bewilder-
ment’). Others translate more correctly, I think, ‘alike’: “deaf 
alike and blind” (Barnes, 1982, p.124), “deaf and blind alike” 
(Long, 1975, p.85) e “como surdos e cegos” (Cavalcante de Sou-
za, 1978, p.142).
16  It is worth noting that even amongst those who translate 
ὁμῶς as ‘alike’, many take metaphorical meaning—which “deaf 
and blind” must be here—in the wrong direction. "ey think 
that ‘deaf and blind’ would de$ne an epistemological meta-
phor of some kind, a comparison to a general theory of human 
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knowledge dependent upon empirical observations rather than 
reason. For example, consider Long (1975, p.87): “Now the dea-
fness and blindness might  be a part of the rhetorical description 
which culminates in τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα […] and largely 
metaphorical. Or it may, if only indirectly, be connected with the 
condemnation of sense perception in B 7.3-5.” Nevertheless, the-
re is no such metaphor here. As Parmenides is simply attempting 
to describe a failure in mortal mental behavior, there is no con-
demnation of sense perception; he is not talking about senses, 
but about “paths of thought” (cognitive operations). 
17  Od. 23. 105: θυμός μοι ἐνί στηθεσσι τέθηπεν, οὐδέ τι 
προσφάσθαι δύναμαι ἔπος οὐδ’ ἐρέεσθαι οὐδ’ εἰς ὦπα ἰδέσθαι 
ἐναντίον.  
18  “Much-discussed” because many scholars like to discuss 
‘the paths’ in Parmenides, particularly their quantity and cha-
racteristics. However, if we substitute less suggestive and more 
prosaic terminology for κέλευθος, such as ‘process’ or ‘proce-
dure’, perhaps such extensive discussion would not ensue.  "e 
meaning of κέλευθος here is a dynamic mental process, and as 
such,  a natural (human) phenomenon, and not a literal path to 
follow or not.  
19  An example, the LSJ reports this meaning (i.e. palin ἐρέει, 
‘speak against’) to already be present in Homer.  In the Iliad (9. 
56), a#er the speech of Diomedes, Nestor says: “Not one man 
of all the Achaians will belittle your words nor speak against 
them.” (οὔ τίς τοι τὸν μῦθον ὀνόσσεται ὅσσοι Ἀχαιοί, οὐδὲ 
πάλιν ἐρέει. Tr. Lattimore).
20  "e proper reconstruction and arrangement of the frag-
ments, gathered from quotations by doxographers and commen-
tators, is a distinct puzzle for the Parmenidean scholar. I have 
relied primarily on Diels-Kranz’s arrangement, as do most scho-
lars, though many other editors suggest other arrangements. In 
the case of fragment 7 in particular, it is a collage of Diels-Kranz’s 
making, adopted only for didactical convenience here.
21  As examples, I report here just two the editors: Coxon (2009, 
p.308): “Parmenides repeats the warning given in fr. 5 (DK B 6) 
against believing in the reality of sensible objects”; Tarán (1965, 
p.78): “What Parmenides says in this passage (vv. 3-5) is that sen-
ses are responsible for the acceptance of the way of non-Being.”.
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22  For example, Untersteiner (1979, p.CXXX): “Infatti, pro-
prio ἀμηχανίη corrisponde a ἔθος πολύπειρον che è propriamen-
te la causa dell’ ἀμηχανίη poiché corrisponde all’atteggiamento 
della meschinità determinate dall’abitudine”.
23  Calogero incorrectly translates “abitudine all’esperienza 
del molteplice” (1977, p.38). Verdenius translates correctly (“cus-
tom that comes of much experience”), but misunderstands it as 
an expression of a perception of inconstancy: “"e method un-
derlying this third way has the same character of inconstancy.” 
(1964, p.55). 
24  A similar criticism is presented by Heraclitus in fragment 
DK 21 B 40: “Much learning does not teach understanding. For 
it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and also Xeno-
phanes and Hecataeus” (πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει· 
Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε 
καὶ Ἑκαταῖον) (tr. Kahn, 1979, p.37). However, Heraclitus’ criti-
cism is not against a particular way of thinking.  "is is evident 
here, as it associates both traditional and non-traditional poets 
(Hesiod and Xenophanes), alongside the very di§erent perso-
nages of Pythagoras (a researcher and mystic) and Hecataeus 
(a researcher of pragmatic culture, and possible geographer). In 
doing so, Heraclitus is actually criticizing polymathia, whether 
traditional or not. When Heraclitus does criticize tradition, he 
does it in his own speci$c way, generically censuring cultural 
behaviors, rather than the behavior of a speci$c person (Frag-
ments DK 21B 5, 14, and 15). "is fact further testi$es for Par-
menides’ own cultural criticism in this passage, as he is similarly 
criticizing cultural behavior at a more general (i.e. non-perso-
nal) level, by criticizing mental behavior of mortals in general. 
"us, Parmenides can be seen as sharing the tendency of other 
Presocratics (Heraclitus, Xenophanes, etc.) to criticize mythic 
thought in favor of new models.
25  Scholars from the second half of the past century on have 
largely set aside the interpretation of a Parmenidean warning 
against senses, and embraced the idea that Parmenides is war-
ning only against the bad use of senses here.  "is move requires 
going against an entry in the LSJ itself, which suggests a parti-
cular contextual translation of νόημα as: “in Philos., thought, 
concept, opp. sensation, sense-presentation, Parm. 8.34 etc.;”. 
Accepting this philosophical de$nition for νόημα as ‘thought in 
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opposition to sensation’, the suggestion of an opposition betwe-
en νόημα in 7. 2 and the role of senses described in 7. 3-5 is qui-
te strong. Nevertheless, this interpretation should be resisted. 
26  Almost all scholars translate “judge by reason” or the 
equivalent “by argument”. "e exception is due to some very few 
authors who consider Parmenides a shamanic $gure, hence, for 
them, reason is not a measure for truth. Notwithstanding, even 
Kingsley, who defends exactly this interpretation of Parmenides, 
though translating ‘by speech’, does not escape from understan-
ding it in the common manner.  Instead, he argues that the Gre-
ek is corrupted, suggesting some ad hoc and incorrect alterations 
(i.e. λόγου, genitive, for λόγωι, dative), in order to achieve this re-
sult: “but judge in favor of the highly contentious demonstration 
of the truth contained in the words as spoken by me.” (Kingsley, 
2003, p.136-140).
27  "is word is the object of many variant interpretations. 
While it is not necessary to examine this in-depth in this inqui-
ry, as it is restricted to the search for psychological vocabulary, 
it is worth noting that the original Homeric meaning (reproach, 
disgrace, dishonor, LSJ) seems to have already been altered by 
the time of Parmenides. "e same LSJ o§ers this Parmenidean 
passage as an explicit example of the meaning “argument of dis-
proof or refutation”. Notwithstanding, this is the meaning used 
by Plato in reference to Socrates’ method, many decades a#er. 
In the literature contemporary to Parmenides, with seldom ex-
ceptions, the main meaning is ‘test’ or ‘proof ’. See the Lesher 
(1984) and against Furley (1989).
28  On eunomy of Elea and nomothetia of Parmenides, see 
Mele, 2005, and Mele, 2006. 
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